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Moral and Legal Accountability for Clinical Ethics Consultants
In "Exploring Accountability of Clinical Ethics Consultants Practice and Training
Implications," Kathryn Weise and Barbara Daly propose a model for the accountability of
clinical ethics consultants (CEC from now on). Here I argue this account is insufficient, and
offer a model for determining the responsibility of CECs.
Weise and Daly offer a two-part definition of accountability, where a CEC is accountable
for her actions if and only if she accepts responsibility for her actions and is willing to disclose
her responsibility to colleagues. CECs, Weise and Daly suggest, are unsure about the scope of
their accountability. Although consultants do not have the final say in medical decisions, their
recommendations can play an important role in matters of life and death. Weise and Daly reject
the idea that CECs are ultimately responsible for the choices made by the group, or the outcomes
of the medical procedures they advise on.
To be accountable for something is to be, in some relevant sense, responsible for that
thing. With their two-part definition of accountability, I think Weise and Daly have confused
two different kinds of responsibility - moral responsibility, and professional responsibility. The
first requirement for accountability, on their model, requires that a CEC accepts responsibility
for her actions; this account is similar to the compatibilist account of moral responsibility
discussed in Fischer and Ravizza, according to which an agent is morally responsible if and only
if she takes responsibility for her actions, where one takes responsibility by coming to see herself
as an appropriate object for praise or blame. (1998) The problem with this account of
responsibility is that an agent can take responsibility for anything, including things that are
wholly outside of their control.

Most philosophers, however, argue that moral responsibility requires control. (See
Strawson 2002; Simkulet 2012) One problem with this commonsense view is that it makes sense
to say that agents are responsible for the consequences of their actions even though these
consequences are, ultimately, outside of our control. (See Zimmerman 1987) However, in each
case in which it makes sense to hold an agent morally responsible for the consequences of her
actions, the consequences are foreseeable outcomes of their free choices. Thus, we are merely
derivatively morally responsible for the consequences of our actions, and truly morally
responsible for our free choices. What makes our free choices morally praiseworthy or
blameworthy is the intent, and care, with which we make them. The right thing is to do what one
has the best reasons to do and to do it for those reasons.
Whether, and to what degree, one is morally responsible is a matter of what choices they
make, and why. It is sometimes hard for external parties to judge who is morally responsible,
and to what degree. Thus, when judging CECs, we ought to focus exclusively on professional
responsibility. If we understand the second part of Weise and Daly's definition of accountability
as an attempt to define professional responsibility, it comes up lacking. While transparency
between consultants is desirable, it is a far cry from responsibility. Weise and Daly recognize
that a CEC's primary obligation is to their patient's welfare. Were a CEC to put any other goal
ahead of their patient's welfare, they are in clear breach of their professional ethics.
It is my goal here to offer a theory on the scope and degree of professional responsibility.
Because we can only be properly held responsible for our free choices, the scope is clear - a CEC
is professionally responsible for any free choice they make as a CEC. The degree of one's
professional responsibility, I suggest, is equally clear - CECs are very responsible. CECs
regularly deal with matters of life and death for their patients, and just medical physician is held

to a high moral standards, so too should CECs. The degree of one's professional responsibility is
determined by the subject matter of one's profession.
I will use the following case to illustrate the scope and degree of a CEC's professional
responsibility. A clinical ethics consultant ends up with the deciding vote as to who will receive
a replacement liver between patients A and B. The candidates are roughly equivalent, each is
divorced with a young child, each needs a liver because of genetic factors, each donates time and
money to charity, and each is in a relatively high risk profession - A is a police officer, while B is
a fire fighter. Because both patients are similar, it would be understandable - and perhaps
acceptable - for the consultant to use an arbitrary decision making process to choose between
them - such as flipping a coin. Suppose that on her way to find a coin to flip, the consultant
discovered some feature about patient A that the consultant disapproves of - A's religious beliefs,
political beliefs, sexual orientation, or hair color - and for this reason votes that patient B should
receive the organ, not patient A.
It strikes me that the consultant's choice in this case would violate their professional
responsibility. The problem here isn't the decision that the consultant makes, or the
consequences of the decision - after all, she might just as easily have chosen patient B by
flipping a coin; rather the problem is that she makes a life or death decision for irrelevant reasons.
It is tempting to say that the consultant places her own personal moral values - in this case her
disapproval of some medically irrelevant facet of patient A's life - above her duty to impartiality
as a consultant; but this isn't correct. What makes an action morally good or bad is the reason
one has to make it, the moral failing here is that the consultant's disapproval is morally suspect.
Each of us has different moral beliefs, but we also have different reasons for our moral beliefs.
A clinical ethics consultant might be morally justified in discriminating against a patient because

of race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, or physical features if they have persuasive reasons to
do so. For example, one might have been raised to believe that as people commit violence, their
hair color turns a darker shade. Such a CEC might be morally justified in discriminating against
dark haired people because they erroneously believe them to be vicious. To make sure that
CECs don't make decisions based on erroneous beliefs, the medical profession requires
transparency with regards to the reasons their CECs make decisions. In the case above, the CEC
fails in their professional obligation to transparency, and fails to offer a substantive reason why
patient A is morally inferior to patient B.
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